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Making work pay? 
 
Fran Bennett and Jane Millar 
 
Abstract 
The growth of wage supplementation through in-work benefits and tax credits has 
been one of the most fundamental recent developments in the UK social security 
system. Broad statements of policy aims such as ‘making work pay’ and providing 
‘support for work’ are superficially simple and clear. In practice, however, they cover 
a complex variety of goals and policy instruments. This article outlines the main 
policy measures introduced since 1997, discusses the different policy goals and 
highlights some of the major limitations of the current policy approach.  
 
Introduction 
Under the Beveridge plan, published in 1942 and implemented after the Second 
World War, there was almost no provision made for those in employment because the 
main purpose of social security was to cover people – male breadwinners in effect – 
for interruptions of earnings due to reasons beyond their control. Thus there were no 
benefits for working people with the exception of family allowances for second and 
subsequent children. But since the 1970s – when Family Income Supplement was 
introduced and housing-related benefits were extended on a national basis – there has 
been a steady growth in the coverage and costs of in-work financial support. The 
recent introduction of tax credits has further increased the importance of in-work 
transfers. The average payment of Working Families Tax Credit in February 2003 
was about £86 per week (Inland Revenue, 2003) and by April 2004 there were about 
1.6 million families with children receiving Working Tax Credit (Inland Revenue, 
2004). Using the social security system – or rather the tax system – to ‘make work 
pay’ has become a key policy goal.  
 
Broad statements of policy aims such as ‘making work pay’ and providing ‘support 
for work’ are superficially simple and clear. In practice, however, they cover a 
complex variety of goals and policy instruments. In this article1, we explore some of 
the tensions and overlaps in the way in which this policy goal has been defined in 
practice in current UK policy. There are three main sections to the article. The first 
outlines the key policy measures introduced since 1997, noting in particular whether 
these are targeted at individuals or households. In the second section we argue that 
there are a number of rather different policy goals being rolled up under the ‘make 
work pay’ heading and that these goals may sometimes be in tension with each other. 
The final section highlights some of the major limitations of the current policy 
approach.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Based on a paper originally prepared for a Joseph Rowntree Foundation seminar held in London in 
January 2004.  
 
Measures aimed at ‘making work pay’ 
Here we identify the main fiscal measures aimed at making work pay2. These can be 
divided into two main groups. First there are provisions aimed at making work pay 
during the transition to work, as summarised in Table 1. These are generally time-
limited measures, or are made in the form of lump sum payments, to enable people to 
manage financially when they start work and have to leave Income Support or 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). The number and range of these have expanded greatly 
in recent years; they include various pilot or trial schemes; and some are paid at the 
discretion of Jobcentre Plus officials (and are therefore not included in Table 1). 
There are also provisions to ‘fast track’ claims to forms of ongoing in-work support – 
to speed up the administration of these new claims, to avoid an overlong gap before 
receipt of support. In addition to these measures aimed at the transition to work, there 
are also measures targeted on those in work, and offering ongoing support. Table 23 
summarises these measures, separately identifying those that are aimed at individual 
low-waged workers and those that are aimed at low-income families/ households4 that 
include someone in work. These are often rather different groups, although they can 
overlap (as in the case of lone parents, for example).  
 
The individually targeted measures are of three main types: the direct regulation of 
wage levels via the National Minimum Wage reductions of income tax and National 
Insurance (NI) contributions and some limited provision of subsidised employment. 
The National Minimum Wage is the most important of these, in that it sets a floor 
below which individual wages should not fall. The new system of tax credits is the 
most important of the non-individually-targeted measures. Working Tax Credit is 
assessed on the basis of family income and other entitlement conditions which relate 
to hours of work (at least 16 hours per week for families with children and disabled 
people and at least 30 hours per week for non-disabled single people and childless 
couples), and to age (non-disabled single people and childless couples must be aged 
25 or over to be eligible). Those working 30 or more hours per week receive a bonus. 
The income tax system, rather than the social security benefit system, has become the 
main vehicle for delivering ongoing in-work support. The Treasury has argued that 
delivery through the tax system makes such support more acceptable because it is 
thereby associated with rewards from work and universal taxation, rather than with 
state assistance and selective benefits (HMT, 1998a, 1998b). However, the delivery of 
Working Tax Credit by employers through the pay packet is now being replaced by 
direct payments by the Inland Revenue (HMT, 2004), largely it seems because 
employers were not willing to continue to take responsibility for administering this 
scheme. But the issue of ‘making more work pay’ – the ‘poverty trap’ caused when 
the combination of increased income tax and NI payments and the withdrawal of 
means-tested in-work support results in high marginal deduction rates – inevitably 
rears its head when discussing ‘make work pay’ policies. And for potential second 
                                                 
2 In this article ‘work’ means paid employment. 
3 Much of the information in these tables is taken from Brewer et al, 2002 and/or Sutherland et al, 
2003. Other information – including the date of implementation and more detail on measures etc – is 
taken largely from the Social Policy Digest, now on-line as part of the Journal of Social Policy – for 
subscribers to the Journal, follow the link at www.journals.cambridge.org/jid_JSP. Some items are 
from the diary of events in Poverty, the journal of the Child Poverty Action Group.  
4 Technically, benefit units, that is, the unit of assessment for the benefit or tax credit.  
 
earners, these two issues may often overlap: policies to ‘make work pay’ impact on 
them as individuals, but policies relevant to ‘making more work pay’ (or not) will also 
impact on them as a member of a family unit which is increasing its paid work in 
total.  
 
The measures outlined above in Tables 1 and 2 have all been implemented, although 
some are/were on a pilot, rather than national, basis. But this is a rapidly developing 
policy area, and several other measures have been announced more recently, to be 
introduced in 2004 or 2005. These include ‘worksearch premia’ of £20 per week 
added to existing benefit levels for some groups out of work, including lone parents 
and incapacity benefits claimants who engage in active job search, as well as pilots to 
pay the same groups ‘return to work credits’ at £40 per week for one year when they 
get into work. In 2005, some couples with children will also be able to get these 
special credits. This means that, for some people, temporary in-work subsidies will be 
running alongside more permanent tax credits, blurring the distinction between 
measures to aid the transition to work and more long-term support in work, as well as 
potentially creating further complexity.  
 
Goals of policies for in-work support  
 
There are various possible goals of policies for in-work support, which might 
therefore lead to decisions to use different policy instruments. Some goals are more 
general and others are more specific to different groups. The more general goals 
include:  
 
• To increase the margin between incomes out of work and in work (which can be 
achieved by decreasing support out of work, as well as by increasing support in 
work), in order to increase the likelihood of taking up work. This may be seen as a 
desirable aim for a variety of different reasons. The traditional economist’s perception 
is that financial disincentives are a major issue for people contemplating entry to 
work, and that paid work may be seen as an undesirable activity unless it pays more 
than ‘leisure’.  
 
• To decrease poverty in work, especially when productivity is not considered high 
enough for an individual to be able to earn a ‘living wage’, and/or employers are not 
considered competitive enough to be able to afford to pay it. This is why, even if in-
work support does not have significant employment effects, this may still not be seen 
as a problem of ‘deadweight’. Because it is contributing to the desired reduction in 
poverty, in-work support is not seen to be wasting resources, even if similar numbers 
would have entered work without it.  
 
• To help workless households get one earner into employment, that is, to make 
work pay for someone with one or more dependants to support; the goal here is to 
reduce the number of households in which no adult is in work (primarily because of 
the resulting poverty). This goal could be said to combine the first two above.  
 
• Related to the above is the goal of facilitating ‘choice’ of family lifestyles. As the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer put it in the 2002 Budget speech, when describing the 
introduction of the new tax credits (including the additional payment of Child Tax 
Credit for the first year after a baby is born), “... mothers who wish to leave work and 
be with their children at home but have found it financially difficult to do so will find 
it easier” (HMT, 2002).   
 
• To complement compulsion and active labour market policies: there is ‘no 
excuse’ not to take work if offered if the total income package in employment is 
adequate.  
 
The more specific policies may be aimed either at those who are considered to have 
permanent/long-term labour market disadvantage, or at those whose disadvantage is 
considered short-term, and policies may differ as a result. The list of policy goals 
below draws on recent work by Sutherland (personal communication), and by Bennett 
and Hirsch (2001):  
 
 • To ease the transition into work: to give temporary additional financial help to 
overcome the barriers to entry into employment (for example, no/ no recent work 
experience), that is, as a ‘trampoline’ into the labour market.  
 
• To substitute for other mechanisms of social protection, especially for couples, 
for example by supporting a couple when one has lost his/her job, or has had to 
decrease his/her hours/earnings (the ‘parachute’ rather than ‘trampoline’ role, as 
Marsh and McKay (1993) put it in relation to Family Credit, the predecessor of in-
work tax credits).  
 
 • To compensate for labour market disadvantage: for example to subsidise those 
with low skill levels or those who suffer discrimination (including because of the 
gender pay gap). 
 
• To subsidise those who incur additional costs if they work, for example 
childcare/other care/some forms of disability. 
 
• To subsidise those with caring responsibilities or those with disabilities who 
therefore cannot work long hours/be flexible/travel to better jobs and so on.  
 
Some limitations of the current approach 
 
Current policy is very much focused on supply-side, rather than demand-side, policies 
to increase employment. But even within this, the current approach to ‘make work 
pay’ contains some tensions on the one hand and does not adequately address some 
important issues on the other.  First, it could be argued that employee rights and 
security at work, including pension provision, may be just as important as higher 
income in work – in other words, that (to adapt the government’s welfare reform 
mantra) ‘security [at work] for those who can [work]’ may be a crucial part of 
ensuring ‘work for those who can’. The government has improved many rights at 
work over recent years – including protection against unfair dismissal, increased 
maternity and parental rights, anti-discrimination legislation, and so on – but with the 
increasing emphasis on ensuring sustainability of employment and retention of jobs, 
there may be a case for pressing this agenda further.  
 
Second, it is difficult for in-work support to promote human capital formation and 
training to increase skill levels. The Chancellor’s 2003 Pre-Budget Report announced 
a ‘new deal for skills’, with windfall tax revenue to be redirected towards mandatory 
skills courses for JSA recipients and basic skills training for people both in and out of 
work. This requires new policy instruments and targets. The government seems to 
have recognised the limitations of in-work support in this area.  
 
More generally, this emphasis on in-work progression may mean a focus on policies 
which initially may appear to be opposed to ‘making work pay’. For example, rights 
to longer maternity/parental leave, and to flexible working, do not immediately make 
work pay in a direct sense. But they can be an effective means of ensuring that 
women do not lose out in the longer term in respect of their job progression and 
lifetime incomes. Arguably there should be more focus on such policies, rather than 
on those that try to shore up low family income at these times. Finally, research into 
joint claims for JSA suggests that benefit disincentives are still a significant issue for 
couples. The joint assessment of out-of-work benefits is an important policy 
problem still to be tackled, and issues of individualisation of benefits are central to 
this.  
 
Conclusions 
Policy choices almost inevitably involve trade-offs between competing goals and 
successful policy instruments may be seeking to achieve several different outcomes at 
the same time. But, as we have shown, the ‘making work pay’ policy agenda is very 
complex. With both a range of goals and a range of measures, there is potential for a 
lack of fit across the various provisions, and for overlaps or even contradictions to 
arise. For example, there is a tension between the targeting of low-paid individuals 
and of low-income families/ households with an earner. Short-term measures intended 
to aid the transition to work are increasingly overlapping with longer-term wage 
supplementation. There are potential tensions between policies that are static and 
focused on family poverty and those that are dynamic and focused on individual 
lifetime income profiles. Thus, as we have described, the new tax credits are static in 
design (in terms of providing support in the current situation) and calculated on a 
family basis (rather than based on the individual); but at the same time, there is an 
increasing interest in improving individual lifetime income profiles, and in 
progression in work and issues of qualifications and skills.   
 
More conceptual clarity is therefore needed in ‘make work pay’ debates. In particular, 
we need to differentiate between low gross hourly/weekly pay levels for individuals in 
work on the one hand, and low disposable income for families with someone in work 
on the other, and to disaggregate the different groups affected by each. In addition, the 
Treasury is currently using in-work support through the tax credit system to pursue 
several different policy objectives. But whether tax credits can bear all this weight is 
open to debate – they are perhaps more of a blunt instrument than a flexible friend. 
And with the agenda on work now moving on to new and challenging goals, their 
limitations also become more apparent.   
 
Table 1: Making work pay: the transition to work 
 
Year   Measure 
 
Dec 1997  Budgeting loans from Social Fund for work-related items 
 
Oct 1998  Linking rule for Incapacity Benefit (to same benefit rate if job fails) extended to one 
year 
 
1999  Budget Fast track proposed to Disabled Person’s Tax Credit for newly disabled 
 
April 1999  Income Support run-on for lone parents entering work (two weeks) 
 
2000 Budget  £100 job grant for job-related expenses on entering work 
 
April 2000  Employment Tax Credit for over 50s long-term unemployed getting low paying job 
 
July 2000  New Deals made ‘permanent’ 
 
April 2001  ‘Choices’ for lone parents includes option of ‘mini-job’ with childcare help for a year 
(and other options) 
 
April 2001  Income Support for mortgage interest: four-week run-on and linking rule 
 
April 2001  Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit run-ons will be more automatic 
 
April 2001  £15/week earnings disregard in Income Support increased to £20 
 
Oct 2001  Rapid reclaim of benefits announced: people who took a job that did not work out 
could go back to benefits more easily 
 
2003 Budget  Eligibility for job grant extended, with £250 rate for those with children. Run-on of 
Housing and Council Tax Benefit also extended. 
 
2004  Child Tax Credit extended to Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support claimants 
(now postponed) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Making work pay: measures primarily targeted on individual low-paid workers 
or families on low incomes with an earner/someone in work 
 
Year    Measure       Target 
 
1998-2000 Earnings Top-up (means-tested in-work benefit) piloted Household 
 
1998 Maximum childcare costs disregard in Family Credit increased Household 
 
April 1998 Subsidised jobs for young under New Deal for Young People Individual 
 
June 1998 subsidised jobs for adult long-term unemployed under New 
Deal 25+ 
Individual 
April 1999 National Minimum Wage becomes law: £3/hr for 18-21s, 
£3.60/hr for adults 
Individual 
 
April 1999 Introduction of 10% lower income tax rate, replacing 20% lower 
band  
 
Individual 
April 1999 Abolition of NI ‘entry fee’ for employees 
 
Individual 
 
Oct 1999  
 
Working Families Tax Credit (with child support disregarded), 
and including Childcare Tax Credit 
Household 
Oct 1999  
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit  
 
Household 
April 2000 Increases in Child Benefit  
 
Household 
June 2000 Increases in Working Families Tax Credit rates for under-16s  
 
Household 
June 2000 National Minimum Wage raised from £3/hr to £3.20/hr (18-21s)  
 
Individual 
Oct 2000 National Minimum Wage increased from £3.60/hr to £3.70/hr 
(adults)  
 
Individual 
Oct 2000 Campaign to encourage take-up of Working Families Tax Credit  
 
Household 
April 2001 Introduction of ‘primary threshold’ (at tax threshold level) for 
employee NI contributions above lower earnings limit 
 
Individual 
Budget 01 Increase in 10% income tax band 
 
Individual 
June 2001 Higher Working Families Tax Credit and Childcare Tax Credit 
 
Household 
Oct 2001 Adult National Minimum Wage increased 10.8% to £4.10 from 
£3.70/hr; and youth rate rises from £3.20 to £3.50 
 
Individual 
April 2002 Independent Living Funds payment rules allow severely 
disabled people with job to keep more of their pay 
 
Individual 
Oct 2002 Adult National Minimum Wage increased 10p/hr to £4.20 and 
youth rate to £3.60  
 
Individual 
June 2002 Increases in basic credits in tax credits  
 
Household 
April 2003 Working Tax Credit: based on 2001/02 income levels initially, 
but current working circumstances 
 
Household 
 
April 2003 Childcare element of Working Tax Credit  Household 
 
Oct 2003 Adult minimum wage increased to £4.50 and youth rate to £3.80  
 
Individual 
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